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1 Introduction
It is a well-known fact that network externalities cause multiple equilibria in economic models.
Indeterminancy arising from multiplicity of equilibria has been incorporated in the theory in the
forms of de facto standards and bandwagon strategy proles. The line of these models can be
traced back to Arthur (1989), David (1985), Farrell & Saloner (1985, 1986), who study technology
adoption, and Katz & Shapiro (1985) who look at brand competition and compatibility between
networks. Those seminal papers and subsequent literature accepting indeterminacy as a character-
istic of economic networks, suggests that market structures in network industries are determined
by random exogenous events. In this paper, we argue that this is partial truth. Uniqueness of
equilibrium follows endogenously in a broad range of heterogenous network models, eliminating
the role of random events in equilibrium selection. Drawing from the theoretical work on coordi-
nation games, we unify the rather ad hoc solutions to the multiplicity problem employed in the
network literature by showing how (i) under perfect information, the achievable intrinsic utility,
which is independent of the network size, must be the dominant criterion in the consumers buying
decision, (ii) under incomplete information, uniqueness is independent of the (relative) strength
of externalities, but requires so called dominance regions of strictly dominant strategies.
We analyse a monopoly pricing problem of a network product. The utility from the product
increases as the number of consumers who buy increases. A version of the model with homogenous
consumers produces multiple equilibria with rational (thus fullled) expectations1 . Multiplicity is
a particularly troublesome problem in this setting, as it hampers equilibrium analysis. The rms
pricing strategy is equilibrium-specic; hence, in order to derive the optimal price, the analysis
must focus on one equilibrium at a time. In addition, there is the extra burden of argumentation
in favour of a particular equilibrium. Since, the arguments are inevitably exogenous to the model,
we do not learn much on rm behaviour at the end. If the exogenous factors that select the
1 Rational expectations require that the expected network size matches the true realised network size. Some
dynamic games adopt myopic expectations. Myopic consumers expect the network size to remain at the current
size. Myopism eliminates multiplicity, but at the cost of (too) severe limitation on consumer behaviour.
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equilibrium are known, why should not the rm take the e¤ort to inuence them rather than
surrender to the situation - inshallah?
Work on network externalities has tried to overcome the problem of multiplicity often by sim-
ply analysing only the most interesting equilibrium, by resorting to arguments that are exogenous
to the model, or by restricting the strength of externalities. Exogenous arguments that are used
to eliminate multiplicity seldom are more than illustrations of expectations and equilibria. Far-
rell & Katz (1998) provide a compelling discussion about di¤erent behavioural cues which align
consumersexpectations in favour of a particular (fullled expectations) equilibrium. They show
how a particular equilibrium is selected when consumersexpectations track surplus, quality, or
when expectations favour stubbornly one rm. Still, the problem of multiplicity is not solved truly
satisfactorily as the motivation for their selection process is exogenous. Uniqueness of equilibrium
that can be reached through exogenous argumentation is, in fact, based on an assumption.
Earlier literature on pricing of network goods has treated the problem of multiple equilibria
in a case-by-case manner. Baake & Boom (2001) analyse a quality di¤erentiated duopoly with
heterogenous consumers with respect to intrinsic utility. They identify that the Nash equilibrium
is unique only if consumers evaluate the competing products chiey in terms of quality (opposed
to perceived network sizes). However, the condition for quality di¤erence they provide is better
interpreted as a requirement for a su¢ cient level of consumer heterogeneity, because quality, in
their model, a¤ects equally intrinsic utility and network size dependent utility. Cabral et al.
(1999) get a unique interior equilibrium by assuming that the discount factor and the parameter
measuring network externalities are not "too large". Bental & Spiegel (1995) analyse only the
non-zero equilibrium associated with (non-zero) fullled expectations. De Palma & Leruth (1996)
obtain a unique equilibrium in a duopoly model, where consumers value network externalities
di¤erently, by allowing the rms to commit to production levels. Economides (1996) studies an
oligopoly market with network externalities. In line with general results, uniqueness of equilibrium
in his model also hinges on the magnitude of network externalities. Equilibrium is unique (and
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interior) only if the externalities function is concave with the marginal externality su¢ ciently
small.
In other cases, where network e¤ects, per se, are not the primary subject of analysis, multi-
plicity is abstracted away by assuming covered markets and high level of product di¤erentiation
for example. This route has been successfully used in the analyses of (physical) network-based
industries such as telecommunications networks (see Armstrong 1998, and La¤ont et al. 1998a
and 1998b).
A model with demand-side network externalities is essentially a coordination game where
agentsactions are strategic complements à la Bulow et al. (1985). A coordination game with
perfect information and homogenous players has multiple equilibria. In most circumstances, equi-
librium uniqueness can be reached if either homogeneity or perfect information is removed.
A coordination game with increasing returns to scale and perfect information can have a unique
equilibrium if players are su¢ ciently heterogenous (Herrendorf et al. 2000). The trade-o¤ of high
heterogeneity is that we must impose quite a stringent set of conditions on the magnitude of
network e¤ects. An alternative route to uniqueness is to limit agentscapacity to observe infor-
mation. Recent work on global games has developed a theory that yields equilibrium uniqueness
endogenously in coordination games2 . Global games originate in Carlsson & van Damme (1993);
the technique is surveyed and advanced in Morris & Shin (2003). In global games, agents obtain
correlated imperfect signals of the true state of some underlying economic fundamental. Given the
signals, agents establish beliefs about the state of the fundamental and, more importantly, about
other agentsbeliefs of the fundamental and even higher order beliefs. Global games provide an
elegant way to achieve uniqueness in situations where homogeneity between agents and common
knowledge result in multiple equilibria.
Whether information is perfect or incomplete, the key to uniqueness is the same. Uniqueness
2 Mason & Valentinyi (2003) derive conditions for existence of unique equilibrium in a larger set of incomplete
information games that includes global games. They show that unique equilibrium exists if the (conditional)
heterogeneity and correlation between consumer types are su¢ ciently high. Their result does not depend on
strategic complementarities or dominance regions that are essential in global games.
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follows when one group of people play one action as a strictly dominant strategy at the same
time as another group of people play a di¤erent action also as a strictly dominant strategy.
The surviving equilibrium is a switching strategy with a uniquely determined cut-o¤ point. The
advantage of global games is that necessary conditions on agent heterogeneity are less restricting.
We can allow high (relative) network externalities; with perfect information externalities must
be bounded. Under perfect information, heterogeneity must be "real" in the sense that the
distribution of consumers must have su¢ ciently broad support. In global games, uniqueness is
guaranteed with su¢ ciently dispersed prior distribution of the underlying fundamental. In other
words, uniqueness requires only a possibility that some consumers obtain extremely low or high
signals. Real heterogeneity can be relatively small. In fact, many global games applications study
the case where signals become perfectly accurate at the limit so that heterogeneity between agents
diminishes to zero.
In this paper, we analyse monopoly pricing under demand-side network externalities. We model
a market where consumers have a need to interact with each other. The monopoly launches a new
device that constitutes an e¢ cient medium for interaction. The fax machine, mobile phone, or on-
line game console are examples of the product we have in mind. The consumer is able to interact
with the new device only with those people who have bought the device as well. Hence, there
is a coordination problem between consumers: whether to switch to the new medium or to stick
with the legacy system. E¤ectively, the consumer benets the more people buy the new product.
We remedy the inherent multiple equilibria problem in two alternative ways. First, we solve the
problem under perfect information. We show how network e¤ects must be limited if uniqueness
is to be reached. Second, we limit consumers capacity to observe information. Uniqueness is
derived using global games techniques.
We analyse the di¤erences between the two ways to reach uniqueness. Perfect information
regime turns out analytically more complicated. We need to keep track about various possible
states of the world. More seriously, unique equilibrium is reached only if network usage does not
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drive consumersdecision making. For a model of network e¤ects this constraint is troublesome.
Global games are analytically more applicable to our model. We also argue that the case of
incomplete information better characterises the real world. When a new device is launched,
people are not able to tell how much utility the device yields to other people. This informational
asymmetry is aggravated the more drastic innovation the new device is.
The benet of uniqueness is that analysis on rm behaviour becomes clear-cut. We derive the
optimal two-part tari¤ structure for the monopoly, and analyse the e¤ects of a marginal change
in heterogeneity (i.e. uncertainty under incomplete information) on the equilibrium. The optimal
unit price is increasing in consumer heterogeneity under perfect information. If information is
incomplete, the price is independent of uncertainty (heterogeneity). When we compare prices
across the informational regimes, we see that the optimal unit price tends to be higher under
incomplete information.
The e¤ect of a marginal change in heterogeneity is ambiguous on prots and consumer surplus
under perfect information. The results are more clear-cut under incomplete information. The
rms expected prots increase as uncertainty is reduced. The e¤ect on expected consumer surplus
depends on the absolute value of uncertainty. The e¤ect of a marginal change in uncertainty is
positive if the change is aligned with the absolute value That is, if uncertainty is high, then
further uncertainty is of good. Similarly, the expected consumer surplus increases when there is
little uncertainty and we further reduce uncertainty.
The global games approach has been successfully used in a number of macroeconomic and
nancial problems. Morris & Shin (1998) analyse a model of speculative currency attacks. Heine-
mann et al. (2004) test experimentally this kind of a currency attack model. Their results support
the switching strategy equilibrium predicted by global games. They also report results that ac-
cord with the comparative statics of global games. Englmaier & Reisinger (2003) apply global
games to an economic development framework. Morris & Shin (2004) and Rochet & Vives (2004)
study solvent but illiquid nancial institutions. Morris & Shin (2004) focus on the question, how
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investorsbeliefs a¤ect the price of debt; whereas Rochet & Vives (2004) explain how the central
bank can prevent bank runs with lender of last resort facilities. Myatt & Wallace (2002) analyse
public goods provision with global games techniques. They use open source software as an exam-
ple. Chwe (1998) provides empirical observations that support global gamespredictions. He nds
that goods with social (network) externalities advertise "more on more expensive popular [TV]
shows because viewers of popular shows know that many other people are also watching (Chwe
1998)".
The present paper, together with Farhi & Hagiu (2004) and Argenziano (2004), are the rst
applications of global games in network economics. These models are also rst to endogenise
the payo¤s with a pricing problem. Both Farhi & Hagiu (2004) and Argenziano (2004) study a
platform competition with pure membership externalities. Our model di¤ers from those models in
that we study a market with membership and usage decisions. We analyse a monopolist that sets
two-part tari¤s whereas Farhi & Hagiu (2004) and Argenziano (2004) analyse a Bertrand duopoly
with linear prices.
Our model is also related to the product di¤erentiation literature. We propose that the case
where the noisy signal of the underlying state directly enters consumers utility function, is a kind of
horizontal di¤erentiation outlined by Hotelling (1929). Telecommunications network competition
models by Armstrong (1998) and La¤ont et al. (1998a and 1998b) are also related to our model.
We analyse similar demand schemes of network usage as these models do, but we extend the model
to analyse also the question whether to subscribe to the service or not.
Finally, the literature on capacity constraints is also relevant. In our two-period model, buying
decisions are done in the rst period, and subsequent usage decisions in the second period. Usage
may be constrained by the number of consumers who bought the product in the rst period.
Hence, the monopolist creates "capacity" for itself.
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2 Model
We begin with an informal description of the model. The market consists of consumers and a
monopoly rm (an innovator). The rm sells a novel device that constitutes an e¢ cient medium
for interaction. Interaction usage is the source of a coordination problem between consumers: the
consumer needs to evaluate the proportion of other people who acquire the device. The problem
we solve is how the rm sets a price for a new network product. The e¢ ciency of the device
is an objective measure. Everybody agrees that all pre-innovation interaction can be mediated
by the new device, and the quality of interaction is improved. Capacity to mediate interaction
is the main functionality of the product, but it also provides standalone services that are used
independently of other consumers. The utility from the product is thus split into usage and
intrinsic utilities. Usage utility is generated by e¢ ciently mediated interaction between people,
and it presents positive network externalities as it increases with the number of people who buy.
Standalone services yield intrinsic utility. Intrinsic utility may include also a status-enhancing type
of utility, any utility derived from use with older generation services (backward compatibility),
and any non-direct benets of being a member of the network (including higher-order interaction
benets3 ).
Consumers are horizontally di¤erentiated according to their perception of the intrinsic value.
Di¤erentiation captures the idea of consumer satisfaction with products technical performance and
status-related aspects. Lower consumer types nd technical performance rather poor. High types
are those who like how the machine works (plus probably get high satisfaction from ownership).
Intrinsic utility does not have to be positive in relation to older generation products. In fact,
depending on the informational regime, equilibrium uniqueness requires a possibility that some
consumers get negative intrinsic utility. We elaborate this point at the end of this section.
Why is intrinsic utility subjected to di¤erentiation while usage is not? On the one hand,
3 Higher order interaction benets comprise utility from interaction taking place between ones friendsfriends,
between friendsfriendsfriends, and so forth.
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usage utility is directly associated with the people who interact, or more precisely, with the social
relation the interacting parties have. The device is a mere medium, which does not inuence the
value of the social relation. We assume that each consumer has equally valuable social relations
and the improvement in e¢ ciency is identical for all. On the other hand, how di¤erent consumers
get utility from the novel features of the device are captured in the intrinsic utility. Clearly, the
capacity to use and the attitude towards new technology di¤er between people.
The new device can be used in interaction only if both parties have bought the product. For
example, let consumer i have a need to interact with j: If both i and j have bought the device,
then they can use it. If either i or j does not have the product, then they use conventional
ways to interact. Interaction is not anonymous. From consumer is point of view, interaction
with j is a di¤erent good from interaction with k: Consequently, inability to interact with j
cannot be compensated by interaction with k: This is what we call an exogenous social network
structure. Each social relation is perceived as independent from other relations and the relations
have di¤erent values. The following claries the exogeneity assumption. Let the new device be a
game console with a play-over-the-Internet capacity. Consumer i has a friend j and a distant (and
boring) relative k: She wants to play games online with j, but not with k. It happens that i and
k have bought the device, but j has not as he likes to play traditional board games face-to-face.
Inability to use the game console with j; does not increase is desire to play with k:
In the main analysis, we assume that each consumer is interested in interacting with the whole
population. In the supplementary section, we analyse a case where each consumer is interested
in interaction with only a sub-set of total population, called neighbours in the social relations
literature. We show in the supplement that the "global" and "local" interaction models coincide
when all consumers have the same number of neighbours.
The reader may want to keep in mind the following two real world examples. First example is
online gaming. Sony PlayStation 2, Microsoft Xbox and Nokia N-Gage consoles all have standalone
and interaction usage features. Players can play alone against the consoles computer or against
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other players on the same console. In addition, console manufacturers run platforms that allow
people to play over the Internet against other people (Sonys Central Station, and Xbox Live; N-
Gage allows to play over the air directly). The requirements are that the players buy the console,
and that they have a broadband connection to the Internet. Moreover, both Xbox Live and Sony
Central Station enable players to talk with each other during a game session. So, the console
in fact enables sessions that are very active social events at best. Firms also o¤er additional
services and content on the platforms. One can think that the underlying social network consists
of players who play the same games or play repeatedly together. It is also usual that people
swap/borrow/trade games with their friends. A person who thinks about buying a game console,
takes into account how many games that particular console has in supply and what is the quality
of the console. Another point he bears in mind is whether his friends have the same console brand
so that he can play with/against them.
The second real world example is mobile telecommunications. Mobile phones can be also used
nowadays for checking latest news and e-mails, or to listen to the radio and music, and even to
watch television. These features create intrinsic value for a phone. The main value driver, of
course, is the possibility to talk with friends and send them messages independent of time and
place.
Let us return to the question how the intrinsic utility can be negative with respect to older gen-
eration products, while the interaction utility is valued objectively positive. An example claries
this point. "Mobility" is the principal improvement of mobile telecommunications with respect to
xed line telephony. Being able to call and to be called independent of time and place is an objec-
tively measured improvement (you can always keep the phone switched o¤ whenever you wish!).
However, mobile phones tend to be small in size and their use can therefore be very di¢ cult for e.g.
old people. The size factor is positive for most people, but it can also be negative. Alternatively,
some people believe that mobile phones emit radiation harmful to the brain. Other people fear
that third parties (big brother) can secretly monitor the user. Whether it is due to the fear of
9
FIRST PERIOD SECOND PERIOD
Firm sets usage fee t.
Consumers choose the
level of usage.
Perfect information:
S and consumer types x are
revealed to all. Firm sets unit
price p. Consumers choose
whether to buy or not.
Imperfect information:
Consumers learn their private
types x. Firm sets unit price p.
Consumers choose whether
to buy or not.
Perfect information:
Actions are revealed.
Imperfect information:
Actions and the realisation
of S and types x are revealed.
Figure 1: Time Line.
brain tumors or malicious surveillance, some people may be reluctant to carry a mobile phone,
even if they get one for free. Obviously, mobile phones have been fairly successful, and a negative
intrinsic value can apply to a handful of people at most; but for uniqueness of equilibrium that is
enough.
2.1 Players and timing
There are I consumers in the market. We normalise I = 1 and treat it as continuous. The
fundamental intrinsic value of the product  is drawn from a uniform distribution F (). Consumer
types x are distributed around the fundamental according to a uniform distribution G (x j ) :
Timing is summarised in gure (1). The game has two periods. In the rst period, the rm sets
unit price p; and in the second period it sets usage fee t: Fixed costs for the rm are assumed zero:
There is a trade-o¤ in choosing the optimal price. A low unit price facilitates coordination between
consumers and increases expected second period prots, but it erodes rst period margins.
The rst period problem for consumer i 2 I is to choose action ai 2 fB;Ng ; where B = buy
the device and N = do not buy. If the consumer chose ai = B in the rst period, then he needs to
decide how much he uses it in the second period. Those consumers, who did not buy, collect the
reservation utility of zero and make no further decisions. Usage is possible only among consumers
who have bought the product. Interaction needs two people, but we assume that only the person
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paying for the usage gets utility. "Reception" is cost-less and yields zero utility, or any possible
positive utility is included in the intrinsic utility. Since usage is a binary operation, it is likely
that in a given social relation, both consumers pay for usage and get utility.
The second period is a standard deterministic utility maximisation problem for the consumers,
and a deterministic prots maximisation problem for the rm respectively. In the rst period,
where the coordination problem is in e¤ect, the model is exposed to two informational regimes.
First, if information is common to all players (consumers and the rm), then all uncertainty is
resolved already at the beginning of the game. The game is deterministic throughout. Second, if
information is incomplete in the rst period, consumers observe noisy signals of  which correspond
to consumer types. The realisations of the signals are private information, but the distributions
F () and G (x j ) are common knowledge. The rm observes nothing and resorts to the prior
F (). Such informational asymmetry is due to our interest in those cases where consumers know
their needs better than the rm. All uncertainty is resolved before players make their second
period decisions.
2.2 Second period
Social relations are unequal in terms of interaction utility. Consumers arrange (mentally) the
whole population in descending order in terms of desire for interaction. The person who is the
most desirable interaction partner gets index 0; and the least desirable person gets index 1: Then,
consumers decide which fraction of population they want to interact with for a given price. The
underlying social network is exogenous so that interaction needs are independent of who buys the
device or of the counter parts utility and respective ranking of interaction partners. Consumer
i may rank j high in terms of desire to interact, but j can rank i independently high or low. A
missed chance of usage because the counter part has not bought the product, is not compensated
by increased usage among other social contacts. As a result, the ordering of desired usage for each
consumer is exogenous, which guarantees that consumers are symmetric with respect to usage
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demand in the second period.
Let i 2 [0; 1] be the marginal person consumer i wants to interact with (i.e. the last person
worth interaction for a given usage price). i = 1 means that i wants to interact with the whole
population. Symmetry of social contacts guarantees i =  for all i 2 I: This formulation makes
it possible that the consumer would like to interact with more people than who have bought the
product. Hence, if the actualised rst period demand is low, the consumer may be constrained
into a sub-optimal level of usage. We sacrice some generality and assume that the marginal
utility is linear, but it will become evident that any function with decreasing marginal utility
yields qualitatively identical results. If fraction q 2 [0; 1] has played a = B in the rst period,
then by the law of large numbers, q is also the probability that a particular person has bought the
product. Due to exogenous social network, the marginal utility from interaction with the social
contact indexed  is @(;t)@ = q (1    t) ; where t is the (scaled) price for usage. Integration
gives the expected usage utility
 (; t; q) = q

  1
2
2   t

;
with the integration constant equal to zero. Because only the proportion q of the population has
bought the product, the consumer cannot use the device with more than q people. Hence, the
consumers second period objective is
max

f (; t; q)g ; s.t.  2 [0; q] :
The optimal level of usage is
 (t; q) = min f1  t; qg : (1)
Consumers wish (but cannot if q < 1) to interact with the whole population when the usage price
is zero. When the usage price tends to one, consumers choose not to use the device in interaction
(and enjoy only of the intrinsic utility).
The rms second period problem is to maximise usage prots by setting the usage fee t.
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Demand is given by equation (1), which has two kinks: one at t = 1  q; and the other at t = 1:
At the latter point demand hits zero.
The rms total 2-period expected prots are E () = E (1)+E (2) ; assuming no discounting.
In the second period, rst period prots and the proportion of consumers who bought the product
are xed, and all uncertainty has been resolved. So, the second period prots are
2 = q
 (t; q) (t  ca) ;
where ca 2 [0; 1] is the unit cost of service.
The optimal fee is always positive. More importantly, the rm charges always a usage fee such
that the consumers are maintained at an e¢ cient usage level, so that an increase (decrease) in
price causes a decrease (increase) in demand. To see this, assume that t is such that consumers
are constrained in their usage, i.e. 1  t > q , t < 1  q. Then, the rm could increase its price
t up till point t = 1   q without triggering a decrease in demand. A similar argument holds for
the situation where the rm charges a price t  1 so that demand is zero. In this case, it would
pay o¤ to reduce the price below one t < 1: These observations allow us to write the rms second
period problem as
max
t
fq (t; q) (t  ca)g ; s.t. t 2 [1  q; 1[ :
The optimal usage fee is
t = max

1
2
(1 + ca) ; 1  q

; (2)
with the interior solution t = 12 (1 + ca) satisfying second order conditions,
@22
@t2 =  2q < 0:
When the optimal usage fee (2) is plugged back into the second period prots, we get the value
functions
2 (ca; q) =
8>><>>:
q2 (ca) ; q  12 (1  ca)
q2 (ca; q) ; q <
1
2 (1  ca)
; (3)
where 2 (ca) =
1
4 (1  ca)2 and 2 (ca; q) = q (1  ca   q) : Double star indicates that the mo-
nopolist is at the interior (unconstrained) solution and single star that the monopolist is at the
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corner solution. Naturally, we have 2 (ca)  2 (ca; q) :
Because the rm keeps consumers at the e¢ cient level of usage,  (t; q) = 1   t and
 ( (t; q) ; t; q) = 12q (1  t)2 hold when t is optimally chosen. Substituting t in the ex-
pected indirect usage utility, we get
 (q) =
8>><>>:
1
8q (1  ca)2 ; if q  12 (1  ca)
1
2q
3; if q < 12 (1  ca)
: (4)
This concludes the analysis of the second period. Next we study the rst period when players
have perfect information. In the section following, we analyse the incomplete information case.
3 Analysis with perfect information
The consumers payo¤ increases in the number of other people buying, exhibiting positive network
externalities. With relatively homogeneous consumers and perfect information, the model pro-
duces multiple equilibria, typical to network externalities models. However, as Herrendorf et al.
(2000) illustrate, heterogeneity between consumers can yield uniqueness in games which homoge-
nous versions produce multiple equilibria. In our model, uniqueness requires su¢ cient amount
of heterogeneity between consumers with respect to intrinsic utility. In other words, uniqueness
results only when network externalities are relatively low. Endogenous pricing is not a remedy to
the multiplicity problem. E¤ectively, when network externalities are relatively low the monopo-
list sets a price which guarantees a unique equilibrium, but for high network externalities pricing
involves multiple equilibria.
The fundamental intrinsic utility  is drawn from the uniform distribution F () over the
support [ M;M ] : When  is the realisation, consumers obtain i.i.d. private values x according
to the conditional uniform distribution G (x j ) over [   ;  + ] : Types x and the value of the
fundamental  are perfectly observed by the consumers and the rm at the beginning of the rst
period.
The payo¤s for di¤erent actions, when the consumer is of type x and the proportion q of
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population play a = B is provided in the table below
others play B others play N
a = B x+ b (q)  p x  p
a = N 0 0
The unit price for the product is p. We have used b (q) = 1q (q) for the indirect usage utility.
When the fraction q of population buy the product, consumers expected utility for a = B when
he is of type x is u (x; q;B) = x +  (q)   p: If x   p > 0; then a = B is strictly dominating
strategy. Action N is strictly dominating strategy when x+ b (1)  p < 0: Action B is the best
response, if the fraction of other people playing B is at least q  p xb(q) : Because the reservation
utility from a = N is zero, the payo¤ gain from action a = B versus a = N is4
v (x; q; p) = x+  (q)  p: (5)
Denote by   the coordination game of perfect information with I consumers, pure actions
a 2 fB;Ng ; and payo¤ v (x; q; p). The payo¤ function (5) is continuous in its arguments, even at
the cut-o¤ point q = 12 (1  ca) where the usage utility  (q) changes its shape. Function (5) is
also di¤erentiable, except at q = 12 (1  ca) : The payo¤ presents strictly increasing di¤erences in
x: Actions are strategic complements, because the payo¤ gain from choosing a = B compared to
a = N is strictly higher when larger proportion of population choose a = B. Since the action set
a 2 fB;Ng is a compact subset of R; the complementarity and continuity properties of v (x; q; p)
imply that   is supermodular (see e.g. Vives 2001 ch.2).
Supermodularity of   guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium (NE), which is solvable
by iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. The equilibrium may not be unique, but
it has a smallest and a largest element. Because actions are strategic complements the largest
equilibrium element is Pareto dominating.
4 The derived payo¤ function is essentially in line with the utility specication of Katz & Shapiro (1985), where
consumers are di¤erentiated in terms of intrinsic utility, and variable utility depending on the network size is the
same for all buyers. De Palma & Leruth (1995) analyse the polar case where buyers have di¤erent valuations for
the network benets.
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The payo¤ (5) actually depends on the consumers expectations about other peoples behaviour.
In equilibrium, expectations are fullled, Ei (q) = q for all i 2 I:When the consumer expects that
proportion E (q) = qe of people play B; he is indi¤erent between buying and not when his type is
x (qe; p) = p   (qe) : (6)
The corresponding demand schedule is
q (p; qe) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0; if x (qe; p) >  + 
1 G (x (qe; p) j ) ; if      x (qe; p)   + 
1; if x (qe; p) <    
: (7)
For a given pair (qe; p) ; if there is a marginal type dened by (6), the type is unique because
v (x; qe; p) is continuous and strictly increasing in x: More "optimistic" expectations reduce the
marginal type, @x(q
e;p)
@qe < 0: This captures the correspondence between e¢ cient coordination and
the maximal NE.
Denition 1 Nash equilibrium of   is the action prole
a = B , x  x (q; p)
a = N , x < x (q; p) ;
where expectations are fullled Ei (q) = q; and x (q; p) = p   (q) for all i 2 I: The maximal NE
element corresponds to Pareto-e¢ cient coordination.
Because the NE action depends on other playersactions, the equilibrium is not necessarily
unique. At the extremes, the rm could set prices for which no-one buys or everyone buys
(granting negative prices). For intermediary prices, there are potentially multiple equilibria. The
rm incorporates consumersexpectations in its price strategy and adjusts its price accordingly.
In equilibrium everyone, including the rm, knows on which NE consumers coordinate, so the rm
aligns its price with the particular NE of the coordination game that emerges.
Consumers who play the bandwagon strategy: "I buy only if you buy" are the cause of mul-
tiplicity. These consumers buy only if su¢ ciently many others buy. If coordination is e¢ cient,
then they in fact buy. In a coordination failure they do not buy; only those consumers who have a
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strictly dominating strategy to buy, will buy. Multiplicity of equilibria is ruled out when we allow
su¢ cient level of heterogeneity between consumers5 .
We allow negative unit prices, but we categorically rule out states  that are prohibitively
negative as well as prohibitively high unit production costs cf in order to exclude those cases
where the rm chooses to remain inactive. If the state  is negative, it means that the rm may
have to compensate some consumers by setting a negative price. Let p (; cf ) and q (; cf ) be
the optimal price and quantity respectively for state  and costs cf . A prohibiting state-cost pair
 ; c+f

is dened implicitly by
0  2

ca; q


 ; c+f

< c+f   p

 ; c+f

, if q

 ; c+f

<
1
2
(1  ca) (8)
0  2 (ca) < c+f   p

 ; c+f

, if q

 ; c+f

 1
2
(1  ca)
For the state-cost pair

 ; c+f

; rst period losses outweigh second period prots.
Dene price p as the solution to v
 
   ; q; p = 0 8q 2 [0; 1] where  is the realisation of
the fundamental. In words, the solution p is the lowest types answer to question: "What is
the lowest price that makes sure that even when everybody else buy, I still will not buy?" The
answer is p =   + 18 (1  ca)2 (to be precise, p leaves the lowest type indi¤erent). Now we have
to distinguish between two cases: (i) (relatively) high network externalities and (ii) low network
externalities. Network externalities are high if they dominate the intrinsic utility in the sense
v (   ; q = 1; p) > v ( + ; q = 0; p) ,  < 116 (1  ca)2 : When network externalities are high,
price p exceeds the highest types intrinsic valuation  +   p < 0:
Proposition 2 Dene
(i) Optimal monopoly price p = argmax f(p)g ; where
(p) =

q (p) (p  cf ) + q (p)2 (ca) ; if q (p)  12 (1  ca)
q (p) (p  cf ) + q (p)2 (ca; q (p)) ; if q (p) < 12 (1  ca)
:
5 A perfectly homogenous version of the model at hand is where all consumers have intrinsic valuation x =  (i.e.
 ! 0). This homogenous version of   has a unique all buy equilibrium when price p < : It has a unique no-one
buys equilibrium for price p >  + 1
8
(1  ca)2 : For intermediary prices p 2
h
;  + 1
8
(1  ca)2
i
there are multiple
equilibria. The set of equilibria includes all buy and all not buy equilibria. In addition there is an equilibrium with
fraction q0 2 ]0; 1[ who play a = B and fraction 1  q0 who play a = N: The fraction q0 depends on price p in the
manner
8<: p <  + 116 (1  ca)
3 () q0 = [2 (p  )] 13
p   + 1
16
(1  ca)3 () q0 = p 1
8
(1 ca)2
:
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(ii) Network externalities are high (low) relative to intrinsic utility when  <(>)
1
16 (1  ca)2 :
With endogenous price setting:
1. If network externalities are high, there are always multiple equilibria.
2. If network externalities are low, there is always a unique equilibrium.
Proof. In the appendix.
We sketch the proof of Proposition 2 here. (1) Consider rst the case where network exter-
nalities are high,  < 116 (1  ca)2 : Assume rst that coordination among consumers is e¢ cient
so that the maximal NE emerges (for a given p). Then the lowest price the rm will ever set is
p dened above. This price corresponds to full demand. In general, monopoly reduces output,
which implies that the optimal monopoly price can be above the price p. Since the optimal price
p >  +  under e¢ cient coordination, all consumers get negative intrinsic utility net of price.
For a given price p >  + ; if coordination is e¢ cient, the maximal NE emerges, but under total
coordination failure, qe = 0, no-one will buy. Both cases correspond to fullled expectations. In
equilibrium, everybody knows which NE takes place. Hence, under the super pessimistic expecta-
tions qe = 0; the rm adjusts its price downwards. The optimal price becomes p <  + ; which
guarantees that the highest type has a strictly dominant strategy to buy. In sum, under high
network externalities, the coordination game   has always multiple equilibria, and the optimal
monopoly price is di¤erent for di¤erent NE. E¢ cient coordination supports the highest optimal
price, and total coordination failure the lowest.
(2) Assume low network externalities  > 116 (1  ca)2. The lowest price the rm will ever set is
p =   + 18 (1  ca)2 : Contrary to the case of high externalities, the lowest price is now uniquely
determined. For p =    + 18 (1  ca)2 the highest type has a strictly dominant strategy to buy.
We show in the appendix that the rm never sets a price exceeding the highest types intrinsic
utility. This gives us a closed interval where the optimal price lies p 2 p;  +  : E¤ectively, p
guarantees that the coordination game   has a unique NE. The idea is that both actions are played
as strictly dominating strategies simultaneously under fullled expectations. Once this happens,
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there is a unique marginal type who is indi¤erent between buying and not buying given by (6).
The rm operates on the elastic section of the demand that is, we have    x (q; p)  +; with
expectations being fullled qe = q: In the unique surviving equilibrium, a fraction q (p) 2 ]0; 1]
buy. Demand is given by
q = 1 G (x (q; p) j ) : (9)
We close this section by deriving the optimal price for a case with a unique equilibrium. There
are two cases to consider: (i) q (p)  12 (1  ca), and (ii) q (p) < 12 (1  ca). Numerical examples
of both cases are provided in the appendix.
(i) Assume rst that q (p) 2  12 (1  ca) ; 1. We get demand from equation (9).
q =
 +   p
2  18 (1  ca)2
: (10)
Monopolys prots are  = q (p) (p  cf )+q (p)2 (ca) : First order condition gives the optimal
unit price
p =
1
2
( + + cf   2 ) : (11)
Second order conditions are satised due to our assumption on low network externalities,
@2(p)
@p2
=   1
  116 (1  ca)2
< 0:
(ii) Assume next that q (p) 2 0; 12 (1  ca) in the second period. In this case, prots are
(p) = q (p) (p  cf )+ q (p)2 (ca; q) : It is more convenient to solve for the indirect demand p (q)
from equation (9), and let the rm choose optimal quantity q. The rst order condition is
2q3   3q2   2 [2  (1  ca)] q +  +   cf = 0: (12)
The second order condition requires
3q (q   1) < 2  (1  ca) :
The resulting optimal price is higher in the case (ii) compared to the case (i), and demand is
(by construction) lower in the case (ii). The second period price t is higher in the case (ii) due
to low demand in the rst period.
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3.1 Equilibrium analysis
Whether heterogeneity between consumers is su¢ cient for uniqueness, can be rephrased as a ques-
tion: Which factor is more important in consumersdecision making: standalone value (intrinsic
utility) or interaction usage (network externalities)? A homogenous version of  , where consumers
decide on the basis of perceived interaction usage, can be changed to a su¢ ciently heterogenous
model by applying a mean-preserving spread on the consumer distribution.
Whenever the condition on su¢ cient heterogeneity is not satised, demand becomes indeter-
minate. At best we can assume that a particular NE emerges, and then characterise the rms
strategy in that equilibrium. We could do this for all possible equilibria. But we would lack any
understanding why a particular equilibrium is selected. One method to select the equilibrium is to
apply some anticipative cues à la Farrell & Katz (1998). For example, if consumers expect e¢ cient
coordination, coordination is e¢ cient in the equilibrium and the rm sets a price corresponding
to that NE. However, this approach is unsatisfactory. Essentially, the anticipative cues just give
one, out of innitely many possible explanations of the conditions which focalise a particular NE.
Equilibrium analysis is complicated since we have to keep track on the various possible states of
, even with low network externalities. We need to distinguish between the cases q (p) < 12 (1  ca)
and q (p)  12 (1  ca) :
Let us rst analyse the case q (p)  12 (1  ca) : The optimal unit price is given by equation
(11) : Price increases as the heterogeneity between consumers increase
@p
@
=
1
2
:
When the optimal price is plugged back into (10) ; we get
q =
 +   cf + 14 (1  ca)2
4
h
  116 (1  ca)2
i : (13)
Di¤erentiation of (13) with respect to  gives
@q
@
>
(<)
0,  <
(>)
cf   5
16
(1  ca)2 :
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The above rule denes a maximum state below which demand is increasing in consumer hetero-
geneity. When the cut-o¤ state  = cf   516 (1  ca)2 is substituted in (13) ; we see that if demand
satises max

1
4 ;
1
2 (1  ca)
	
< q (p)  1; a marginal increase in consumer heterogeneity decreases
demand, @q(p
)
@ < 0: The marginal type is determined partly by the second period usage utility.
Because consumers take into account their second period utility, an increase in heterogeneity has a
stronger e¤ect on demand than in the standard case where the marginal type is solely determined
by the unit price. Demand increases in heterogeneity only if the state is low enough relative to
unit costs adjusted with usage utility. A marginal increase in  has a stronger e¤ect on demand,
the less heterogenous consumers are (that is the closer  is to 116 (1  ca)2).
Prots in the case q (p)  12 (1  ca) are
(p; t) =
h
 +   cf + 14 (1  ca)2
i2
8
h
  116 (1  ca)2
i :
Consumer surplus is given by
S =
1
2
Z +
x=x(q(p);p)
x+
1
8
(1  ca)2 q (p)  pdx
=
8<: +   cf + 14 (1  ca)
2
4
h
  116 (1  ca)2
i
9=;
2
:
A marginal change in  has an ambiguous e¤ect on prots and consumer surplus. There is a
tendency for them to move in the same direction for marginal changes in : Prots increase when
@p
@ and
@q(p)
@ are both positive. In the cases where demand decreases as  increases, prots tend
to decrease when  is close to its minimum (demand e¤ect is stronger), and prots tend to increase
as the absolute value of  is large.
If costs are high so that the rm is constrained in the second period, q (p) < 12 (1  ca) ; a
marginal change in consumer heterogeneity has a familiar e¤ect on demand. Totally di¤erentiating
the rst order condition (12) ; gives
dq
d
> 0, q < min

1
4
;
1
2
(1  ca)

dq
d
< 0, 1
4
< q <
1
2
(1  ca) :
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As a result, a positive marginal change in  causes similar e¤ects on demand as in the case where
the rm is not constrained in the second period. Comparative statics for prots and consumer
surplus are ambiguous and computatively complicated but present analogous tendencies.
4 Analysis with incomplete information
In the previous section we derived conditions for su¢ cient heterogeneity between consumers that
guarantees uniqueness of equilibrium. We had a trade-o¤ between the strength of network e¤ects
and heterogeneity. If we go for unique equilibrium, network externalities must be limited. This of
course is perverse, if the model is designed to study network externalities.
Global games techniques require a di¤erent type of heterogeneity. We must have a possibility
that the fundamental  takes very low and very high values. Uniqueness does not hinge on the
true heterogeneity between consumers (represented by the distribution G (x j )). A limitation of
playerscapacity to observe information pays back in the relaxation of conditions for uniqueness.
The game remains otherwise unchanged from the perfect information case, except that con-
sumers and the monopolist do not observe directly  until at the end of period one. The actual
value of  is drawn again from the uniform distribution F () with support [ M;M ]. Consumers
observations of  are blurred by noise. On the other hand, second period usage utility  (; t; q)
is deterministic as the timing proves. The rm resorts to the prior on  in its estimates. The
consumers know that the rm is uninformed, which removes all possible information about  that
might otherwise be inferred from prices (p; t) :
The consumer i gets an i.i.d. signal xi =  + i; where i is uniformly distributed on [ ; ] :
The consumer who observes signal x gets an expected payo¤ gain from action a = B versus a = N
v (x; q; p) = x+  (q)  p: (14)
Note that the signal enters directly the payo¤ function. Uncertainty over  is thus a kind of
horizontal di¤erentiation. First period game is now a global game with private values. The
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payo¤ function is continuous in (x; q) ; even at the point q = 12 (1  ca) where the indirect usage
utility  (q) changes its shape. Payo¤s are di¤erentiable with respect to x everywhere, and the
relation between payo¤s and the signal x is positive, @v(x;q;p)@x > 0: We also have strategic action
complementarities in the sense @v(x;q;p)@q > 0 (everywhere outside the cut-o¤ point q =
1
2 (1  ca)).
In addition, the payo¤s satisfy the "strict Laplacian state monotonicity" assumption (see Morris
& Shin 2003). Namely, there exists a unique ex that solves R 1
q=0
v (ex; q; p) dq = 0: In sum, the payo¤
function (14) satises all the standard assumptions on strategic complementarities and continuity
that global games require. The remaining condition we need to impose on payo¤s in order to be
able to use global games techniques is on dominance regions.
Condition 3 Existence of dominance regions.
(i) 9  2 ] M;M [ so that v (x; q; p) < 0 for all q 2 [0; 1] and x  :
(ii) 9  2 ] M;M [ so that v (x; q; p) > 0 for all q 2 [0; 1] and x  :
Note that the limits of the dominance regions are strictly contained within the prior distribution
of . In other words, the prior of  is su¢ ciently dispersed so that the boundaries of the distribution
cause no trouble. Because the support of the prior is bounded, the Condition 3 is not trivially
satised, as it would be if the support was from minus innite to innite (as in the case of
e.g. normal distribution). Moreover, the dominance regions are endogenously determined due to
monopoly pricing. In the appendix we derive su¢ cient bandwidth properties for the prior F ()
and the conditional distribution of signals G (x j ) so that Condition 3 holds.
Denote by  II the incomplete information game with I consumers, pure actions a 2 fB;Ng ;
payo¤ (14), and where  has a uniform prior, signals are i.i.d. and uniform, and where the
distributions satisfy Condition 3. The coordination game  II is supermodular since the action
set is a compact subset of R; and the payo¤ function (14) is continuous in its arguments and
it has increasing di¤erences in x: The implications of supermodularity are familiar: (i) a pure
strategy Bayesian NE exists (not necessarily unique), (ii) the equilibria set has a smallest and
largest element, and (iii) if there is a unique equilibrium, it is solvable by iterated deletion of
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strictly dominated strategies. Furthermore, due to action complementarity, the largest equilibrium
element Pareto dominates other equilibria. This observation is, however, redundant as we will show
that the game  II has a unique Bayesian switching equilibrium denoted by  II :
Proposition 4 Let ex be dened as the unique solution to R 1
q=0
v (ex; q; p) dq = 0. The game  II
has a unique switching strategy equilibrium  II that survives iterated deletion of strictly dominated
strategies. The unique equilibrium strategy satises a (x) = N for all x < ex and a (x) = B for all
x > ex:
Proof. In the appendix.
We can now compute the marginal signal ex that acts as the cut-o¤ rule in the equilibrium
strategy. Any observed signal above (below) this cut-o¤ gives positive (negative) payo¤ for a = B.
At the margin, when the consumer observes x = ex exactly, he is indi¤erent between actions. His
expectations about the fraction of people who play a = B follows a uniform distribution on the
unit interval. The marginal signal is given by
Z 1
2 (1 ca)
q=0
ex+ 1
2
q3   pdq +
Z 1
q= 12 (1 ca)
ex+ 1
8
(1  ca)2 q   pdq = 0; (15)
where we have taken into account the cut-o¤ point t = 12 (1 + ca) )  (t; q) = 12 (1  ca) ;
which is the point where the rm reaches its interior optimal usage fee. Integration of equation
(15) gives
ex = p+  (ca) ;
where  (ca) = 1128 (1  ca)2
h
(1  ca)2   8
i
captures the expected second period usage utility.
When  is the realisation of the fundamental, the proportion of consumers who get signals
higher than ex is q = 1 G (ex j ). They eventually buy the device. First period demand is
q (; p) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1; if  > ex+ 
+ (ca) p
2 ; if ex      ex+ 
0; if  < ex  
: (16)
Having dened the demand, we can turn to the pricing problem. Dene the cut-o¤ state b as
q
b; p = 12 (1  ca) : Whenever the true state is higher than b; the rm is not constrained in its
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second period problem, and its second period prots are 2 = q

2 (ca). If the state is  < b;
the optimal usage fee is at the corner solution t = 1   q, and rms second period prots are
2 = q

2 (ca; q) :
By assumption, the rm resorts to the prior in the rst period, but it internalises the e¤ect of
p on the second period prots. Firms expected prots are
E () = E (1) + E (2)
= 12M
nR ex+
=ex  q (; p) (p  cf ) d + RM=ex+ p  cfd+
+
R b
=ex  q (; p)2 (ca; q) d + R ex+=b q (; p)2 (ca) d + RM=ex+ 2 (ca) do
(17)
Two rst integrals in equation (17) are associated with rst period prots. Three last integrals
capture the e¤ect on second period prots. The tails of the priors support do not cause trouble
here, because consumersbehaviour does not change (due to dominance regions).
Maximisation of (17) gives the optimal price p: Denote the true state as ; then the optimal
price structure can be presented as in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 The optimal price structure is
t = max

1
2
(1 + ca) ; 1  q ()

p =
1
2
(M + cf )  1
2
 (ca)  1
8
(1  ca)2 :
Proof. Derivation of the optimal price structure is in the appendix.
The optimal prices are increasing in the usage cost,
dp
dca
=
1
16
(1  ca)

1
4
(1  ca)2 + 3

 0;
and
dt
dca
=
8>><>>:
1
2 ; q (
)    t = 12 (1 + ca)
1 ca
4
h
5
8   132 (1  ca)2
i
; q () < 
 
t = 12 (1 + ca)

which is positive for 0  ca < 1; and zero if ca = 1 and the rm is at the corner solution in the
second period.
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The optimal unit price is increasing in unit production cost, @p

@cf
> 0: The usage fee is inde-
pendent of production cost, as long as the rm is not constrained when setting t: If the realised
demand binds the optimal usage fee, then we have @t

@cf
= 14 > 0:
4.1 Role of uncertainty on prots and consumer surplus
Demand increases (decreases) in the precision of signals only if the revealed state  is higher (lower)
than the marginal signal. Why? When the precision of the signal is high, it tells the consumer
that other people observe signals very close to the one he has observed. If the realisation of 
is below the marginal signal, and if signals are relatively accurate, then the consumer infers that
most people do not buy. So, if  < ex and we decrease the precision of signals (d > 0), then a larger
proportion of people may observe signals that are higher than the marginal signal. Therefore, a
reduction in the precision of signals when  < ex increases actual demand. Opposing, if  > ex
and signals are relatively precise, the consumer knows that other people observe signals close to
true : If we reduce the precision of signals, a larger proportion of people observe signals that fall
below the marginal signal. Therefore, a reduction in the precision of signals when  > ex decreases
demand. We summarise the above in Lemma 6.
Lemma 6 Decrease in precision of signals decreases (increases) demand when true  is above
(below) the marginal signal, @q(;p)@
<
(>)0()  >(<)p+  (ca) ; ex      ex+ :
Proof. Proof follows directly from equation (16), and thus omitted.
The optimal unit price p is independent of uncertainty over signals. This is because we have
assumed uniform distributions for the prior and signals. Resulting demand is linear, which renders
rst period prots E (1 (p)) neutral with respect to : If the rm reaches the interior solution
t = 12 (1 + ca) in the second period, also the usage fee is independent of any uncertainty. However,
if the rm is pushed to the corner solution, the optimal usage fee is a¤ected by uncertainty over
signals. When the rm is constrained, we have @t

@

q(;p)< 12 (1 ca)
=  @q(;p)@ : The constrained
optimal usage fee is higher than the interior solution. Because the rm is constrained with low
values of ; it is likely that @q(
;p)
@ > 0 holds. If the change in demand is positive
@q(;p)
@ > 0;
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the rm is able to lower its usage fee.
Because there is the possibility that the realised demand is low and the rm cannot charge
the unconstrained optimal usage fee, expected second period prots are not independent of the
precision of signals. The expected total prots are positively correlated with the precision of
signals.
Proposition 7 Increase in the precision of signals increases rms prots
@E ( (p; t))
@
=   (1  ca)
4
192M
 0:
Proof. In the appendix.
If  is increased marginally, in states that are below (above) the marginal signal demand
increases (decreases). Whenever  < ex   rms prots are zero. Therefore states that are above
the marginal signal have a larger weight in expected prots. Therefore, the negative e¤ect on
demand is dominating. The negative e¤ect on rms prots comes from those (high) states where
consumers are very condent on high sales. When uncertainty is increased, people have lower
expectations on sales volumes, which induces lower sales and prots.
Consumers expected surplus is
E (S) =
1
4M
(Z b(p)
=ex(p) 
Z +
x=ex(p) x+
1
2
q (; p)3   pdxd+ (18)
+
Z ex(p)+
=b(p)
Z +
x=ex(p) x+
1
8
(1  ca)2 q (; p)  pdxd+
+
Z M
=ex(p)+
Z +
x= 
x+
1
8
(1  ca)2   pdxd
)
:
To see the e¤ect of a change in signalsprecision, di¤erentiate (18) with respect to : The sign
of @E(S)@ depends only on ca and : Denote the solution to
@E(S)
@ = 0 by  (ca) : We have plotted
 =  (ca) in gure (2). Above the curve, the derivative is positive,
@E(S)
@ > 0; and below the curve
we have @E(S)@ < 0:
Proposition 8 A decrease in signals precision (d > 0), induces:
(i) For relatively precise signals  <  (ca), a decrease in expected consumer surplus.
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Figure 2: The Sign of @E(S)@ .
(ii) For relatively imprecise signals  >  (ca), an increase in expected consumer surplus.
Unlike with prots, the absolute magnitude of  plays a role in whether consumer surplus
increases or decreases for marginal changes in the precision. When the signals are very precise (
below the curve in gure (2)), the expected consumer surplus decreases as the precision of signals
is marginally decreased (d > 0). When signals are less precise ( above the curve in gure (2)),
consumer surplus is positively a¤ected by a marginal increase in uncertainty. Expected surplus is
a¤ected via two e¤ects. For a given ; there is a change in the expected utility. There is also a
change in the expectation of  (that is, how the integration intervals change).
We can split the support of  into sections and analyse what happens in each section. For a
given ; consumers payo¤ is independent of  if  > ex+ : Consumers payo¤ decreases in  when
ex <  < ex+ : Payo¤ increases in ; when the state is ex   <  < ex: Payo¤ is zero for  < ex  :
When  increases, the highest segment [ex+ ;M ] shortens. Segment [ex; ex+ ] grows. For ca > 0;
segment
hb; exi grows, but for ca = 0; the cut-o¤ points coincide b = ex: The segment hex  ;bi
grows for 0 < ca < 1; but for ca = 0 we have b = ex and the segment is unmodied, for ca = 1;
we have b = ex    so that the segment is of zero length. Finally, when  increases, the segment
[ M; ex  ] ; where payo¤s are zero, shortens.
28
The negative e¤ect on surplus is foremost associated with the very high states ( > ex + ),
where expected consumer surplus unambiguously reduces as  increases. This is the segment where
consumers are condent on high sales. The negative e¤ect is stronger the smaller  and ca are,
which shows up in that the total e¤ect turns negative in the area  <  (ca). For lower values of
; there is a mixture of positive and negative e¤ects. The summation of e¤ects returns the result
illustrated in gure (2).
We have a minimum for E (S ()) given by  (ca) ; captured in the curve in gure (2). If signals
are extremely precise (! 0), so that consumers are homogeneous, the consumer benets from the
knowledge that other people are like him. In this case, network externalities have important role in
decision making. When we reduce the precision of signals, the little uncertainty about other people
hurts. However, when the precision of signals drops to a relatively low level ( >  (ca)), higher
uncertainty is of good. Why? Low precision is analogous to heterogeneity between consumers.
If signals are imprecise, the consumer knows that there is a large variance in the perception of
the true intrinsic value of the product within the population, and knows that other people know
that everybody is equally uninformed. The consumer is then likely to base his buying decision
on the intrinsic utility, rather than on the expected the behaviour of other people. In this case,
the consumers benet from further knowledge (d > 0) about the fact that they can base their
decisions on their private values. Similarly, if signals are accurate ( <  (ca)) ; further information
(d < 0) on that perceived network externalities are driving everybody elses decisions increases
expected surplus.
5 Comparison
In this section we discuss the di¤erences between perfect and incomplete information regimes.
We focus on the perfect information case where (i) network externalities are su¢ ciently low to
guarantee a unique equilibrium, and (ii) the rm is not constrained in the second period giving
a higher monopoly price compared with the constrained case. Let us restate the optimal prices
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under perfect and incomplete information for reference
pPI =
1
2
( + ) +
1
2
cf   1
8
(1  ca)2
pII =
1
2
M +
1
2
cf   1
8
(1  ca)2   1
2
 (ca) :
The term   18 (1  ca)2 ; present in both price equations, is the e¤ect from second period prots.
The rm takes into account that high rst period price reduces second period prots. This e¤ect
is eliminated if we introduce perfect competition in the second period, so that usage fee is t = ca.
The optimal rst period monopoly price under incomplete information when the second period is
characterised by perfect competition is
pC =
1
2
(M + cf   C (ca)) ;
where C (ca)   (ca)  0: Derivation of pC is in the appendix.
Prices pPI and p

II diverge in two respects. First, because the rm observes nothing under
incomplete information, it takes expectations on the consumer distribution. So, we haveM replac-
ing  +  in the prices. Consequently, the price tends to be higher under incomplete information.
Only when the realised state  is close to the upper limitM so that there are types aboveM; price
is higher under perfect information. Under incomplete information, the unit price is independent
of the term measuring heterogeneity  (i.e. independent of uncertainty), which is in contrast to the
perfect information case, in which the rm increases the price for a marginal increase in consumer
heterogeneity.
The second, more interesting, di¤erence is the term   12 (ca)  0; which captures the rms
(accurate) perception on what are consumersexpectations on the second period usage utility.
Because under perfect information, all players (including the rm) observe perfectly how much
usage utility consumers get in the second period, the e¤ect is neutralised in the unit price. There
is a one-to-one relationship between expected usage utility (qb (q)) and rst period price p =
 +    q

2  b (q). Under incomplete information, consumersexpectations are "xed", so
there is a (potential) gap between expected and actual usage utility. This gap induces a safer
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pricing strategy: the rm prices high in the rst period, before consumers learn the true state,
at the expense of more uncertain second period prots. When the rm is uncertain about second
period usage utility, it adjusts its price upwards. This e¤ect is aggravated, when the second period
is characterised by perfect competition (with incomplete information). We have   12C (ca) 
  12 (ca) ; so the monopoly has incentives to set even higher price. It does not have any incentives
to insure second period prots by setting a low rst period price. Demand, however, is higher for
the (second period) competition case than for the two-period monopoly, q (pC) > q (p
), because
the monopoly limits supply in the second period.
The expectations mechanism a¤ects the realised demand, and we cannot tell unambiguously,
whether demand is higher under perfect or incomplete information. Numerical simulations that
we have carried out tend to result in higher demand under perfect information.
The term determining real heterogeneity between consumers (and measuring uncertainty), ;
has an important role for coordination on a unique equilibrium under perfect information. This
role is taken away if consumersvaluations are private information (but correlated). Even the
smallest amount of uncertainty is su¢ cient to result in a unique equilibrium, whereas we had an
explicit rule for minimum heterogeneity under perfect information.
If  < 116 (1  ca)2 under perfect information, the game is inicted by the multiple equilibria
problem. If coordination failure is imminent, rms preferences over heterogeneity di¤er under
perfect and incomplete information regimes. Let the network externalities be high and information
perfect. If the market sentiment is pessimistic, so that coordination is prone to fail, the rm may
prefer more heterogeneity between consumers. Higher heterogeneity facilitates coordination on
the e¢ cient NE. Under super pessimistic expectations, the rm prefers high heterogeneity which
would support a (larger) unique equilibrium. If we maintain high network externalities, but impose
incomplete information, coordination is una¤ected by the real heterogeneity between consumers.
Moreover, we know that the rms prots increase as  decreases, @E((p
;t))
@ < 0: So it prefers
little heterogeneity.
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Perfect information is a strong condition. For ordinary consumable goods, the assumption
on perfect information does not (necessarily) create problems. But, in problems of coordination,
even marginal di¤erence between perfect information and almost perfect information can produce
strikingly di¤erent outcomes (see the discussion in Morris 2002). We have presented a model of
adoption of a new device that enables e¢ cient interaction between people. The analysis shows that
whether we impose perfect or incomplete information, the predictions of the model di¤er. The
analytical easiness of the incomplete information model compared with the perfect information
case, favours the limitation of peoples observation capabilities. More importantly, for a novel
product, incomplete information regime also characterises the real world more accurately. Just
think about how we are more capable of saying how much utility a fax machine or e-mail client
software yields to other people today than, say, we were twenty years ago. As the product matures,
information becomes more accessible.
6 Concluding remarks
We have analysed a market for network goods. A monopolist launches a device that enables
e¢ cient interaction between people. Hence, consumers face a coordination problem whether to
switch to using the new device or to stick with the prevailing interaction systems. This kind of
coordination game has multiple Nash equilibria under perfect information and homogenous players.
We have done a comprehensive analysis how uniqueness of equilibrium can be reached in our model.
The interpretation we have given for the necessary conditions for uniqueness apply to network
models in general. Uniqueness of equilibrium under perfect information requires high consumer
heterogeneity. Adversely, we must limit the role of network externalities in consumersbuying
decision making. Under incomplete information, uniqueness of equilibrium arises endogenously,
as long as the prior distribution of the underlying economic fundamental is su¢ ciently dispersed.
The key to uniqueness is the same in both informational regimes. When one group of people
play "Buy" as a strictly dominant strategy, at the same time as another group play "Not Buy"
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as a strictly dominant strategy, the resulting equilibrium is unique. Both information regimes
required some level of heterogeneity, but the type of heterogeneity is di¤erent in the two cases.
Under perfect information, heterogeneity between consumers had to be real. Under incomplete
information, uniqueness does not hinge on the real heterogeneity between people, which can be
minimal. Instead of real heterogeneity, we needed to raise a possibility that the fundamental value
of the product can be very low or very high. Hence, the cost of heavier informational system
imposed by global games pays back in less restricting assumptions on model parameters.
Uniqueness of the equilibrium allowed us to carry out comparative statics analysis. The
monopoly price is independent of consumer heterogeneity under incomplete information, but it is
increasing in heterogeneity under perfect information. The optimal price tends to be higher under
incomplete information.
A marginal change in consumer heterogeneity has an ambiguous e¤ect on prots and consumer
surplus under perfect information. The e¤ect is even more ambiguous if network externalities
are strong, so that we have more than one Nash equilibrium in the coordination game. Under
incomplete information, rms expected prots increase as the precision of signals improves (i.e.
heterogeneity between consumers is lowered). The e¤ect on expected consumer surplus depends
on the absolute level of the signals precision. The expected consumer surplus increases if the
marginal change in the precision of signals is in-line with the way consumers base their buying
decisions. If signals are precise (imprecise), further improvement (reduction) in accuracy raises
surplus. In this sense, better agreement on the factor that drives decision making among the
consumers is of good.
Perfect and incomplete information regimes yield strongly di¤erent predictions about adoption
of a new interaction device. On the one hand, under perfect information, the coordination failure
is a probable scenario. If the main selling argument is based on interaction usage, the perfect
information variant is in trouble in explaining which equilibrium is the most probable one. On
the other hand, under incomplete information, there is no coordination failure. We have argued
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that for novel goods the private information case is more realistic characterisation of the world.
So, facing castigation in the board room of Electro Fads ltd.6 , the Sales and Marketing Director
cannot hide behind "bad market sentiments", but should blame (justly) the Product Development
Director for the low quality of the device.
The incomplete information case o¤ers a number of possible extensions that would be inter-
esting to analyse. We have used fairly specic distributions, and utility functions, that could be
generalised. The uniqueness result also allows analysis on strategic investments that has been pre-
viously obstructed by the multiplicity problem in network models. We assumed that consumers
know their needs better than the rm. It would be interesting to allow the rm to observe some-
thing more than nothing. It could then use prices to manipulate consumersperceptions of the
value of the fundamental.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proofs and numerical examples for perfect information regime
Multiple equilibria under high network externalities. We show that when network
externalities are high,  < 116 (1  ca)2 ; (i) under e¢ cient coordination (corresponding to the
maximal NE of the game  ), there exists a prots maximising price which exceeds the highest
types intrinsic utility; (ii) any prots maximising price p associated with e¢ cient coordination
induces multiple equilibria, and therefore under a coordination failure, the rm chooses a lower
price than under e¢ cient coordination. Prohibitive state-cost pairs

 ; c+f

dened in (8) are
categorically ruled out.
(i) When coordination is e¢ cient, we have a minimum price that the rm will ever charge
p =    + 1
8
(1  ca)2 ;
which corresponds to the price that leaves the lowest type indi¤erent between buying and
not when everybody else buys. By the assumption of high network externalities, we have
p > + : There is also an upper boundary price p = + +  (q), above which it becomes
dominant strategy for everyone not to buy. Note that the upper boundary price is less than
what leaves the highest type indi¤erent between buying and not buying when everybody
else buys. Hence, if there is a prots maximising price under high network externalities,
it belongs to the closed interval p 2 p; p : Demand q (p) given by (7) is continuous in
p in the interval

p; p

due to continuity of types x and continuity of  (q) in q: Because
demand is zero at the upper extreme, q (p) = 0; the rm makes zero prots (p) = 0: At
the low extreme, demand equals one, q
 
p

= 1; but prots can be anything depending on
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cost parameters and the realisation of the state. Firms prots are
(p) =
8>><>>:
q (p) (p  cf ) + q (p)2 (ca) ; if q (p)  12 (1  ca)
q (p) (p  cf ) + q (p)2 (ca; q) ; if q (p) < 12 (1  ca)
: (19)
Due to continuity of demand in p 2 p; p ; prots (19) are continuous, even at the cut-o¤
point q (p) = 12 (1  ca) : By WeierstrassTheorem, there exists p 2 argmax f(p)g in the
interval

p; p

: The optimal price may be an interior solution or a corner solution.
(ii) From part (i), we know that the optimal price is bounded in the region p 2 p; p when
coordination is e¢ cient. Importantly, the lower boundary price exceeds the highest types
intrinsic utility, p >  + : Consider next the case where the rm sets price p 2 p; p
expecting e¢ cient coordination, but consumersexpectations are super pessimistic, E (q) =
0: But, we have p >  + , so all consumers now expect negative payo¤s from buying, and
therefore no-one buys. Any price p 2 p; p supports both an e¢ cient coordination NE
where a positive proportion of consumers buy, and a "no-one buys" NE. In equilibrium, the
rm, of course, knows to which NE consumers coordinate on and adjusts its price accordingly.
Under total coordination failure, E (q) = 0; the highest price that guarantees that the "no-
one buys" equilibrium is evaded is p =  + , at which point the highest type becomes
indi¤erent between buying and not when no-one else buys. Consequently, the rm sets a
price p <  +  and makes positive prots.
From (i) - (ii) we get the result that under high network externalities, there are always multiple
equilibria in the consumerscoordination subgame   parameterised by price. It is worth noting
that e¢ cient coordination NE and super pessimistic expectations NE correspond to rational ex-
pectations, E (q) = q: We need some exogenous cues à la Farrell & Katz (1998) to explain which
NE emerges. For each equilibrium expectation we obtain a specic demand function. Optimal
monopoly price is di¤erent in di¤erent NE. E¢ cient coordination supports the highest optimal
price which is set above the highest types intrinsic utility. Under a coordination failure, the
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monopoly incorporates the pessimistic expectations and adjusts its price downwards. At the ex-
treme, under total coordination failure, the rm must set a price below the highest types valuation.
Unique equilibrium under low network externalities. We give proof that under
low network externalities,  > 116 (1  ca)2 ; the optimal price is always bounded within p 2
   + 18 (1  ca) ;  + 

: This price yields a unique equilibrium. The proof is constructed in
two steps. First, we show that the optimal price is always bounded from below. Second, we show
that the price is also bounded from above. Thanks to continuity properties we have a price that
maximises prots.
Let us start by restating the indi¤erent type, when consumer expectations are E (q)  qe
(equation (6))
x (qe; p) = p   (qe) ;
which gives the corresponding demand schedule (equation (7))
q (p; qe) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0; if x (qe; p) >  + 
++(qe) p
2 ; if      x (qe; p)   + 
1; if x (qe; p) <    
:
In equilibrium, expectations are fullled, so that qe = q: Prohibitive state-cost pairs

 ; c+f

dened in (8) are categorically ruled out.
(i) The lowest price the rm will ever charge is p =   + 18 (1  ca) : This price leaves the lowest
type indi¤erent between buying and not when everybody else buys. By the assumption of
low network externalities, for price p =     + 18 (1  ca) ; the highest type has a strictly
dominant strategy to buy. Since the highest type has strictly dominant strategy to buy, even
under super pessimistic expectations (E (q) = 0) the rm makes positive sales with price p:
(ii) Next we prove that the optimal price does not exceed the highest types valuation, p  +.
Start by assuming q (p)  12 (1  ca) : In this case, the demand corresponding to fullled
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expectations is given by
q (p) =
8>><>>:
+ p
2[  116 (1 ca)2]
; if    + 18 (1  ca)2  p   +   (1  ca)
h
  116 (1  ca)2
i
1; if p <    + 18 (1  ca)2
:
We have @q(p)@p < 0 in the range where the demand is elastic. So, the highest feasible price is
obtained when demand is q = 12 (1  ca) : This price is p = + (1  ca)
h
  116 (1  ca)2
i

 +  with equality at ca = 1:
Assume next that q (p) < 12 (1  ca) so that the rm is in the corner solution in the second
period. It is now more convenient to solve for the inverse demand function. In equilibrium,
we have the price
p (q) =  +   q

2  1
2
q2

; (20)
which can be increasing in q 2 0; 12 (1  ca) : The rm maximises prots by choosing
quantity q 2 0; 12 (1  ca). Since we are interested in the possibility of the case p (q) >
+; the term in parenthesis in (20) should be negative. So, we require that  < 14q
2 holds. As
we combine this condition with the initial assumption on low network externalities, we have
a range within the heterogeneity parameter must be strictly bounded 116 (1  ca)2 <  < 14q2:
This condition is the least binding when demand q is at maximum. But, our assumption q <
1
2 (1  ca) gives the maximal consistent equilibrium demand level. Once this level is plugged
into the condition, we end up with 116 (1  ca)2 <  < 116 (1  ca)2 ; which cannot hold.
Hence, if we force  < 14q
2 to hold, we violate 116 (1  ca)2 < ; and vice versa. Consequently,
the price remains bounded from above p (q)  +: Note that price is continuous in q 2 [0; 1] :
If we plug q = 12 (1  ca) in (20) ; we get p =  +   (1  ca)
h
  116 (1  ca)2
i
:
In (i) - (ii) we have established that the rm sets a price p 2    + 18 (1  ca) ;  +  : Firms
prots are
(p) =
8>><>>:
q (p) (p  cf ) + q (p)2 (ca) ; if q (p)  12 (1  ca)
q (p) (p  cf ) + q (p)2 (ca; q) ; if q (p) < 12 (1  ca)
:
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Because prots are continuous in p there exists a prots maximising price p 2    + 18 (1  ca) ;  + 
by WeierstrassTheorem.
For price p; the lowest type gets zero payo¤ at maximum
v (   ; q; p)  0 8q 2 [0; 1] : (21)
At the same time, the highest type always gets at least zero payo¤
v ( + ; q; p)  0 8q 2 [0; 1] : (22)
Inequalities (21) and (22) establish (weak) dominance regions. Despite that at the boundaries
p 2    + 18 (1  ca) ;  + 	 everybody may play the same action, the equilibrium is unique.
When the price is p =     + 18 (1  ca) the lowest type is indi¤erent between buying and not,
so the indeterminacy is limited to him only. Similarly, when the price is p =  + ; the highest
type is indi¤erent between buying and not, and he is the only one whose action is indeterminate.
Since these are marginal cases, we can ignore them. As a result, the equilibrium is unique.
Cases q (p) <  and q (p) >  under su¢ cient heterogeneity for uniqueness. We
provide two examples that illustrate how the monopolist sets price so that it is (i) constrained in the
second period, and (ii) reaches interior optimum in the second period. Assume that consumers
are su¢ ciently heterogenous, or in other words, network externalities are relatively low,  >
1
16 (1  ca)2 in order to a have a unique equilibrium.
(i) Let ca = 14 ; cf =
12
10 ;  = 1; and  =
1
2 : Start by assuming q
 < 12 (1  ca) = 38 : Demand is
obtained from equation (12), q  0:2614; which is consistent with our initial assumption.
The corresponding price is p (q)  1:2475. We can check that the equilibrium is unique.
Even with super pessimistic expectations the highest type has a strictly dominant strategy
to buy, v ( + ; qe = 0; p)  0:2525: The lowest type has a strictly dominant strategy not to
buy, v (   ; qe = 1; p)   0:6772 even under super optimistic expectations: The indi¤erent
type is located at x  1:2386: Firms prots are (q; t) = 0:0458; and it makes prots in
both periods.
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(ii) Let ca = 14 ; cf =
1
2 ;  = 1; and  =
1
2 : Start by assuming q (p
) > 12 (1  ca) = 38 : Optimal
price is given by equation (11) ; p = 119128 : Plugging p
 in equation (10), we get the rst
period demand q (p) = 73119  0:6134; which is consistent with our initial assumption. We
can check that the equilibrium is unique. The highest type has a strictly dominant strategy
to buy, v ( + ; qe = 0; p) = 73128 : The lowest type has a strictly dominant strategy not to
buy, v (   ; qe = 1; p) =   2364 : The indi¤erent type is located at x = 211238 : Firm makes
prots in both period. Total prots are (p; t)  0:3499:
8.2 Proofs for incomplete information regime
Su¢ cient bandwidth in the incomplete information regime (Condition 3). The domi-
nance regions must exist for all consumer expectations. We show that as M is su¢ ciently large,
lower and upper dominance regions coexist.
(i) Let us rst consider the upper dominance region: 9  2 ] M;M [ so that v (x; q; p) > 0 for
all q 2 [0; 1] and x  : Assume that consumers are optimistic and expect full coverage
qe = 1. Because consumers expect qe = 1; they also expect second period usage utility
 (qe) = 18 (1  ca)2 : The consumer who observes x and has expectations qe = 1; gets
expected payo¤ gain v = x + 18 (1  ca)2   p: Because v (x; q; p) is strictly increasing in x;
we get a marginal type xqe=1 = p   18 (1  ca)2 who is indi¤erent between buying and not
buying. The true demand schedule under expectations qe = 1 is
q (p) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0; if xqe=1 >  + 
++ 18 (1 ca)2 p
2 ; if      xqe=1   + 
1; if xqe=1 <    
(23)
Demand (23) corresponds to the most "optimistic" expectations, thus it supports the highest
monopoly price. Dene the cut-o¤ state bqe=1 below which the monopoly is constrained in
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the second period and above the rm reaches the interior solution. The monopolys expected
prots, when consumer expectations are optimistic qe = 1; are
E () =
1
2M
(Z bqe=1
xqe=1 
q (p) (p  cf ) + q (p)2d+ (24)
+
Z xqe=1+
bqe=1 q (p) (p  cf ) + q (p)

2 d +
+
Z M
xqe=1+
p  cf + 2 d
)
:
Optimisation of (24) gives price
pqe=1 =
1
2

M + cf   1
8
(1  ca)2

:
The second order conditions are satised, @
2E()
@p2 =   1M < 0: Given the price pqe=1; the
highest type must have a strictly dominant strategy to buy, even if no-one else buys, M +
   pqe=1 > 0; where we have used  (qe = 0) = 0; which gives the following condition on
the bandwidth of s and xs distribution
M + 2 > cf   1
8
(1  ca)2 : (25)
(ii) A similar line of reasoning must apply to the lower dominance region, 9  2 ] M;M [ so that
v (x; q; p) < 0 for all q 2 [0; 1] and x  : Now, we look for the optimal price corresponding
to the most "pessimistic" expectations qe = 0: This price is the lowest price the rm will
ever set. We skip the derivation of the true demand schedule corresponding to expectations
qe = 0; and the calculation of the respective optimal price. The procedures are identical to
those explained in part (i). Given the optimal price pqe=0 =
1
2
h
M + cf   14 (1  ca)2
i
corre-
sponding to the most pessimistic expectations, the lowest type must have a strictly dominant
strategy not to buy, even if everybody else buys,  M    + 18 (1  ca)2   pqe=0 < 0: Note
that we need to apply  (qe = 1) = 18 (1  ca)2 : The second order conditions are satised,
@2E()
@p2 =   1M < 0: As a result, the following requirement for distribution bandwidths is
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obtained
 M   2
3
 <
1
3

cf   1
2
(1  ca)2

: (26)
The requirements (25) and (26) are satised simultaneously when we expand the support of
F () by increasing M su¢ ciently. When M is su¢ ciently large, the heterogeneity  can a¤ord to
go to zero at the limit.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof follows Morris & Shin (2003). We look for a switching
equilibrium with a unique switching point. The switching strategy with a cut-o¤ point k is a
function
s (x) =
8>><>>:
N , if x < k
B, if x > k;
where the consumer is indi¤erent between actions at the switching point k:
When a consumer has observed signal x; he places (conditional) density h ( j x) on any state
: Denote f () = 12M as the unconditional density of the uniformly distributed underlying funda-
mental. When a state  is realised, signals are also uniformly distributed, so that the density of
signals is g (x j ) = 12 : The conditional density of ; when signal x has been observed, is
h ( j x) =
8>><>>:
f()g(xj)R x+
=x  f()g(xj)d
; if x      x+ 
0; otherwise
=
8>><>>:
1
2 ; if x      x+ 
0; otherwise
:
The probability that a signal higher than k is observed when the state is  is  (k) = 1  
G (k j ), where G is the uniform conditional distribution function of density g (x j ) on the
support [   ;  + ] : The probability  (k) is decreasing in k and increasing in : By the law of
large numbers,  (k) equals the probability that fraction  (k) of (other) people at maximum get
signals higher than k. The expected payo¤ gain from choosing action a = B for a consumer who
has observed signal x and knows that all other consumers will choose action a = N if they observe
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signals less than k can be written as
E [v (x; k; p)] =
R x+
=x  h ( j x) v (x;  (k) ; p) d
= 12
R x+
=x  x+ 
 ( (k) ; t)  pd;
(27)
where  ( (k) ; t) is the indirect usage utility, as dened in equation (4) : The expected payo¤
(27) is continuous in x and in k despite the kink in the demand for usage.
Next we show that the expected utility E [v (x; k; p)] is strictly increasing in x and strictly
decreasing in k everywhere, i.e. it presents increasing di¤erences and strict strategic complemen-
tarities.
Even though usage is always at optimal level from the consumers point of view, we need
to consider two cases in order to prove @E[v(x;k;p)]@x > 0 and
@E[v(x;k;p)]
@k < 0: First, when the
rm reaches its interior optimal fee t = 12 (1 + ca) ; the expected payo¤ (27) is E [v (x; k; p)] =
1
2
R x+
=x  x+
1
8 (1  ca)2  (k)  pd: In the second case, the rm is constrained to t = 1   (k) ;
and the expected payo¤ (27) is E [v (x; k; p)] = 12
R x+
=x  x+
1
2 (k)
3   pd:
When consumers are at their optimum, and the rm at the interior solution, we have
@E [v (x; k; p)]
@x
= 1 +
1
16
(1  ca)2 > 0;
and
@E [v (x; k; p)]
@k
=   1
16
(1  ca)2 < 0:
On the other hand, when consumers are at optimum, but the rm is at the corner solution,
we have
@E [v (x; k; p)]
@x
= 1 +
1
163
h
2 + 3 (  k + x)2
i
> 0:
It is equally straightforward to compute that
@E [v (x; k; p)]
@k
=   3
82
Z x+
x 
 (k)
2
d < 0:
Combining the results of both cases, we get that @E[v(x;k;p)]@x > 0 and
@E[v(x;k;p)]
@k < 0 hold
everywhere. In words, expected payo¤ is increasing in own type and in the number of other
people playing a = B (i.e. decreasing in the cut-o¤ signal used by other people).
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Let  (k) be a point at which E [v (x; k; p)] = E [v ( (k) ; k; p)] = 0: This means that the best
response to a switching strategy with a cut-o¤ point k is a switching strategy with a cut-o¤ point
 (k) : In equilibrium, we must have  (k) = k: By induction, strategy s (x) survives n rounds of
iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies if
s (x) =
8>><>>:
N; x < 
n
B; x > n;
where 
0
=  M and 0 =M; and where n and n are dened inductively by

n+1
= min
n
x : E
h
v

x; 
n
; p
i
= 0
o
(28)
and
n+1 = max

x : E

v
 
x; n; p

= 0
	
: (29)
First, let us assume that this holds for n rounds. If a = B is the best response to a strategy
that has survived n rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, then a = B must
be a best response to a strategy with a cut-o¤ rule 
n
: The minimal signal x where this holds
is dened as 
n+1
, i.e. E
h
v


n+1
; 
n
; p
i
= 0 holds as proposed in (28). Similarly, if strategy
a = N is the best response to a strategy that has survived n rounds of iterated deletion of strictly
dominated strategies, then it must be the best response to a strategy with a cut-o¤ n: Cut-o¤
point n+1 is dened as the maximal signal for which this holds.
Since E [v (x; k; p)] is continuous and strictly increasing in x and strictly decreasing in k, the
sequences 
n
and n are monotone. The sequence n is increasing, with 0 =  M <  <

1
; where  is the boundary value for the lower dominance region dened in Condition 3(i).
Similarly, n is a decreasing sequence, with 0 = M >  > 1; where again, the boundary
value  is dened as in Condition 3(ii). As the number of iterations grows n ! 1; the se-
quences converge 
n
!  and n !  due to increasing di¤erences and strategic complementaries
@E[v(x;k;p)]
@x > 0 and
@E[v(x;k;p)]
@k < 0

, continuity of E [v (x; k; p)] and the construction of  and :
Thus, we get E

v
 
; ; p

= 0 and E

v
 
; ; p

= 0:
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Next we establish that  and  coincide. When the equality is true, there is a unique switching
strategy with a unique switching point. The probability that a consumer observes a signal higher
than k; when the true state is , was given by  (k) = 1   k +2 . By the law of large numbers,
the fraction of other people who observe signals higher that k is less than q when
q  1  k +2
)   k + 2q   :
(30)
Write the probability (the consumer assigns to the event) that a proportion less than q of other
people observe signals higher than k; when the consumer has observed signal x
	(q; x; k) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1; k + 2q    > x+ R k+2q 
=x  h ( j x) d; x    k + 2q     x+ 
0; k + 2q    < x  
(31)
where h ( j x) = 12 is the density the consumer assigns to state  when he has observed signal
x: The feasible integration range of  in equation (31) is obtained from system (30). When x is
observed, states farther than  away from x are assigned zero density. Integration gives
	(q; x; k) =
1
2
(k + 2q   x) ;
for x    k+2q    x+ : In equilibrium x = k as the iterated deletion of strictly dominated
strategies suggests. The probability becomes an identity function 	(q; x; x) = q: The probability
	(q; x; x) is also the cumulative distribution function of q on the unit interval [0; 1] : It is now
seen that the distribution of q is uniform on support [0; 1] ; with density  (q) = 1: The expected
utility for action a = B versus a = N; when the expected fraction q of neighbours choose a = B;
is therefore
E [v (x; q; p)] =
R 1
q=0
 (q) v (x; q; p) dq
=
R 1
q=0
v (x; q; p) dq:
The indi¤erent type (consumer with signal x) in equilibrium is given by E [v (x; x; p)] = 0:
Hence, by the fact that there is a unique solution ex to R 1
q=0
v (ex; q; p) dq = 0, the expressions for
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expected payo¤ can be equated. As a result, the equilibrium strategy has a unique switching point
x = ex, which is given by equation
Z 1
q=0
v (ex; q; p) dq = 0:
The surviving equilibrium switching strategy is
s (ex) =
8>><>>:
a = B; if x > ex
a = N; if x < ex :
Proof of Proposition 5. Write the expected prots (17) as
E () =
1
2M
hR ex+ex  q (; p) (p  cf ) d + RMex+ p  cfd+
+
R bex  q (; p)2 [1  ca   q (; p)] d + R ex+b 14 (1  ca)2 q (; p) d+
+
RMex+ 14 (1  ca)2 di :
By di¤erentiating the above expression with respect to p; we get the FOC
@E ()
@p
=  2p+M + cf    (ca)  1
4
(1  ca)2 = 0: (32)
The optimal price is
p =
1
2
(M + cf )  1
2
 (ca)  1
8
(1  ca)2 :
It is seen directly from the FOC (32) that second order condition for local maximum is satised
@2E ()
@p2
=  2 < 0:
Because the rst period prots maximisation problem is unconstrained, p gives the global
maximum.
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Proof of Proposition 7. We write the prot function with optimal price structure as
E [ (p; t)] =
1
2M
"Z ex(p)+
ex(p)  q (; p
) (p   cf ) d +
Z M
ex(p)+ p
   cfd+ (33)
+
Z b(p)
ex(p)  q (; p
)2 [1  ca   q (; p)] d +
+
Z ex(p)+
b(p)
1
4
(1  ca)2 q (; p) d +
+
Z M
ex(p)+
1
4
(1  ca)2 d
#
:
To see the e¤ect of an increase in the precision of signals, we di¤erentiate (33) with respect to
: By applying the envelope theorem, we get the reported result
@E [ (p; t)]
@
=   (1  ca)
4
192M
< 0:
8.3 Vertical separation: perfect competition in second period
The introduction of competition in the second period does not change the solution process. The
coordination game satises global game conditions.
In the second period price is t = ca; which gives indirect usage utility
 (q) =
8>><>>:
1
2 (1  ca)2 q; q  1  ca
q
 
q   12q2   caq

; q < 1  ca
:
The marginal signal is
ex = p+ C (ca) ;
where C (ca) = 124 (1  ca)2
h
(1  ca)2   6
i
 0: In calculating the marginal signal, we need to
take into account the cut-o¤ point q = 1  ca:
The rm does not take into account whether consumers are constrained in the second period
or not. The rm maximises expected rst period prots
E (1 (p)) =
p  cf
M
(M   p  C (ca)) :
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The monopoly price equals
pC =
1
2
(M + cf   C (ca)) :
The second order conditions are satised, @
2E(1(p))
@p2 =   1M < 0: If we plug the optimal price back
to the demand function, we get
q (pC) =
 +   12M   12cf   12C (ca)
2
;
where  is the realisation of the state : If we compare q (pC) with the monopoly demand of the
main model
q (p) =
 +   12M   12cf   12 (ca) + 18 (1  ca)2
2
;
we see that demand is higher with competition in the second period, q (pC) > q (p
) : This happens
because the monopoly restricts demand in the second period, which reduces expected usage utility.
9 Supplementary section: social relations approach
In the main analysis we adopted a "global" way of looking at network externalities. Each consumer
has a need to interact with any randomly chosen person from the rest of the population. In other
words, each consumer is linked with everyone else. In the terminology of graph theory, the
population is characterised by a complete graph of social relations. As a result, we can model
network externalities with a function that captures the relevant properties of interaction. A
complete graph, however, generates the maximal value for a given number of network members,
and therefore we risk overestimating network e¤ects when the true network is something less
connected (Sääskilahti 2005).
The class of network models, so called economics of social relations, that has emerged as a
renement to the conventional approach to network e¤ects starts by explicitly considering who
is connected to whom. Agents have varying number of connections, depending on the network
they belong to. If we think of personal social relations, it is obvious that some people have more
connections (large family, a lot of friends) whereas some people are more introvert and maintain
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only few close relationships. Importantly, no-one knows each member in the society. Because
agents lack connections with members of the network, they cannot have a need to interact actively
with them. Thus, criticism on the functional form approach to network externalities is valid.
There is a rapidly growing literature on social relations. Applications range from job search
and unemployment (Calvó-Armengol & Jackson 2004, Bramoullé & Saint-Paul 2004), to wage
di¤erentials between employees (Bentolila et al. 2004, Labini 2004), to public good provision
(Bramoullé & Kranton 2004), buyer-seller networks (Kranton & Minehart 2001) and R&D coop-
eration (Goyal et al. 2003), to risk sharing (Goldstein et al. 2002) and social learning (Gaduh
2002) in village economies, all the way to crime (Glaeser et al. 1996, Ballester et al. 2004). Chwe
(2000) studies how political action di¤uses in social networks when agents use the network to
communicate their willingness to adopt a revolutionary action. His work is analogous to product
di¤usion, where certain consumers (rich or pro new technology) buy the product early and who are
followed by mass market adoption. Our related work is a model of monopoly pricing of network
goods (Sääskilahti 2005). The focus of that article is on how asymmetric social relations a¤ect
monopoly price.
Local interaction models comprise a related eld of study (see e.g. Young 1998 ch.6). These
models focus on the equilibrium selection in dynamic settings where boundedly rational agents
interact with a subset of the total population. Agents take myopic actions in a coordination game
with exogenous payo¤s (no price setting problem). Agents are only imperfectly rational as an
occurrence of a mutant agent (who chooses actions randomly) is positive over time.
The complete graph structure incorporated in the model in the main text usually serves as the
benchmark case in the social relations literature. Models of social relations focus on (i) asymmetric
networks where some agents have more connections than others, and consequently on (ii) local
interaction networks.
Asymmetry between consumers induces the rm to treat consumers di¤erently. Central people
with more connections are more important to the whole network, and tend to capture higher
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surplus than more peripheral consumers (Sääskilahti 2005). In some networks, asymmetry in
the number of connections regularises as the network size grows (random graphs), whereas in
other networks it magnies (scale-free networks) (see Albert & Barabási 2002 for technical review,
Barabási & Bonabeau 2003 for informal discussion, and Sääskilahti 2005 for an application to a
monopoly pricing problem). Regularisation means that the network, despite being asymmetric,
presents a priori regular characteristics. In particular, the number of links each node has in a
random graph follows a Poisson distribution. Thus, the average number of links is well-dened.
Scale-free networks lack such regular statistical properties.
If we conne our analysis on symmetric local interaction models, it turns out that the model
in the main text coincides with a social relations approach. That is proved here.
There is a mass I of consumers who are exogenously arranged on a graph G so that each
consumer is located on a unique node of G: We normalise I = 1 and treat it as continuum as
in the main model. The set of undirected edges (links) on G is E : Two consumers i and j are
neighbours if they are connected by an edge, fi; jg 2 E : The edges are undirected so that, if
(i; j) 2 E ) (j; i) 2 E : The set of consumer is neighbours is Ni; with Ni 6= ; so that there are no
isolated nodes (i.e. the network is completely connected)7 .
Assumption A1 The graph G is completely connected, symmetric and n-dimensional.
Assumption A1 means that every consumer has n 2 ]0; 1] neighbours. Consumer is neigh-
bourhood Hi is dened as a collection of i and the set of his neighbours, Hi = fi;Nig : We can
allow each consumers neighbourhood to consist of all other consumers, Hi = fi;Gig. This
case corresponds to the global interaction model presented in the main text. Since the graph
is innitely large (because consumers are weightless), link conguration with everybody holding
identical number of links is guaranteed to exist.
Opposed to the main model, each consumer is now interested only in interacting with his own
7 Note the di¤erence between complete graph (= everybody is linked with everyone else) and completely con-
nected network (= there is a path between any two network members expanding one or more links).
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neighbours only. A link is said to be potentially active if both end nodes have bought the product.
Interaction between two consumers is represented by the activation of the link between them.
Activation is a directed process, so that both end nodes can activate the same link, but only if
both have got the product. Reception of an activated link is automatic.
The problem for consumer i 2 G is to choose action ai 2 fB;Ng ; where B = buy the device
and N = do not buy. If he chooses ai = B; then he needs to decide which links he activates in
the second period. Dene an active link between agents i and j as eij = 1: If only one agent
buys or neither buy, the edge cannot be activated: eij = 0. A potentially active link is activated
if the consumer pays the activation fee t. Activation yields utility which presents decreasing
marginal utility. Because social relations are exogenous, the activation need is independent of
the number of neighbours who buy. Let i =
P
j2Ni eij
n be the fraction of active links per total
number of neighbours. We have i 2 [0; 1] : i = 1 means that all links are activated. Symmetry
and exogeneity of social relations guarantee i =  for all i 2 G: This formulation makes it
possible that the consumer would like to activate more links than there are potentially active
links. Reception of an active link is free of charge and does not give utility.
Marginal usage utility is @(;t)@ = q (1    t) ; where q 2 [0; 1] is the probability that neigh-
bour indexed  has bought the product in the rst period and t is the per link activation fee. By
law of large numbers, q is the proportion of consumers who bought the device in the rst period.
Consumers second period objective is to maximise expected usage utility,
max

f (; t)g ; s.t. 0    q:
The optimal level of usage is
 (t; q) = min f1  t; qg :
Because all consumers are symmetric, rms second period problem is identical to the one in
the main model. In the second period, rst period prots and the proportion of consumers who
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bought the product are xed, so, we can write second period prots as
2 = q
 (t; q) (t  ca) ;
where ca 2 [0; 1] is the per link activation cost.
The rm charges an activation price such that the consumers are maintained at an e¢ cient
level of link activation (see the main text). We can write the rms second period problem as
max
t
fq (t; q) (t  ca)g ; s.t. t 2 [1  q; 1[ :
The optimal usage fee is
t = max

1
2
(1 + ca) ; 1  q

:
We have arrived to identical optimal levels  and t as in the main model. These give us
value functions  (t; q) and 2 (t
; q) which match equations (4) and (3) respectively.
For perfect information regime, we have to assume that all neighbourhoods are identical in
order to have all the arguments of the main text go through. Identical neighbourhoods means
that in each neighbourhood, consumer types are distributed uniformly over [   ;  + ] : This
constraint is quite strong, and it reduces the applicability of the model under perfect information.
On the contrary, in the incomplete information regime, we do not need to make any additional
assumptions to the main model. If Condition 3 (dominance regions) holds, all the arguments of
the main model go through.
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